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The illicit practice of conducting economic espionage' against a
business competitor is not new to the world business community.
However, an increasing number of United States corporations have
become the target of foreign economic espionage designed to surrepti-
tiously appropriate critical United States technology and information. 2
1 According to Professor Warner of the University of Kentucky, the broad nature of the
term "economic espionage" is preferable over the more familiar "industrial espionage" because
it is more descriptive of the contemporary economic rivalry and conflict between nations. Profes-
sor Warner maintains that in the modern global economy, having secret or at least confidential
information about such matters as government trade initiatives or private marketing decisions
can be often-as valuable as the acquisition of a hard technology or process. The term also serves
to distinguish traditional geopolitical or military espionage which specifically target a nation's
capabilities and intentions to wage war. William T. Warner, International Technology Transfer
and Economic Espionage 2 n.2 (1992)(unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
2 While testifying before the House Subcommittee on Economic and Commercial law,
Geoffrey E. Tbrner defined "Economic Espionage" as the surreptitious acquisition of corporate
trade secrets, advanced technology, product information, business plans, and various types of
proprietary information which can provide competitors with a distinct market advantage. The
Threat of Foreign Economic Espionage to U.S. Corporations, 1992: Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. on Economic and Commercial Law of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong., 2d Sess.
192 (1992)[hereinafter The Threat](statement of Geoffrey E.'Turner, Senior Consultant, Infor-
mation Security Program, Senior Research Institute).
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The intrusion into corporate information systems and the interception
of business messages in commercial and private networks through the
use of economic espionage is a real and ongoing threat. Unfortu-
nately, many United States corporations are unaware of this danger
and are therefore vulnerable to such activity.3 The origin and magni-
tude of modem economic espionage invariably means that the threat
facing American corporations has now spread to all types of United
States businesses, not just those sectors which have traditionally been
the target of such action.4
The resulting damage to United States industry from foreign
based economic espionage ultimately serves to weaken the ability of
United States corporations to compete in the world market. In an era
of global economic interdependence, such an effect constitutes a
threat to the United States' economic vitality. This effect in turn, ulti-
mately has a detrimental impact upon the United States' national
security.
Current debate over appropriate methods for curbing the threat
of economic espionage revolves around unilateral and multilateral
forms of action. There are two kinds of solutions on which the United
States could focus its resources and efforts. One involves "supply
side" solutions, such as export controls and individual corporate se-
curity. The other requires the use of foreign governments, United
States intelligence agencies, and domestic law enforcement mecha-
nisms to remedy the problem.5 Currently, debate exists as to which of
these solutions should be emphasized. To a certain extent, the pur-
pose of this comment is to describe the current threat to United States
industry from foreign based economic espionage. Within this context,
this comment defines the national security threat from economic espi-
onage in economic terms. Consistent with this approach, this com-
ment advocates the use of Section 301 of the Omnibus Trade and
Competitiveness Act of 19886 as a stop-gap measure to combat the
threat of economic espionage until a more thorough and appropriate
solution can be achieved.
3 Id.
4 Mr. Turner cites the defense industry as one example of an industry that has traditionally
been the target of foreign based economic espionage. The Threat, supra note 2, at 192.
5 Professor Warner framed these issues by asserting that if technology transfers cannot be
controlled within acceptable societal cost parameters, then alternative policies should be ex-
amined to implement foreign policy goals. Warner, supra note 1, at 2 n.1.
6 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 1301, 102 Stat.
1107, 1164 (1988)(amending §§ 301-309 of the Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C.A. §§ 2411-2419
(West 1978 & Supp. 1989))[hereinafter Omnibus Trade Act].
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II. THE EXTENT OF THE THREAT
The technological revolution, the end of the Cold War, and recent
developments in the global economy have brought about the rapid
growth of information technology as well as the development of new
sophisticated devices and technology for acquiring confidential infor-
mation from competitors. 7 The tremendous scientific and technologi-
cal advances of the past few years have merely heightened the
importance of having the right information at the right time.8 Foreign
efforts to obtain critical information have included eavesdropping, ho-
tel room burglaries, the introduction of "moles," and various other
sophisticated intelligence techniques. Economic espionage cases in
recent years, for example, have revealed that foreign national and cor-
porate operatives have increasingly assumed such seemingly legiti-
mate positions, such as corporate executives in the United States.9 A
survey by the American Society for Industrial Security reported that
in 1991 alone, thirty-seven percent of the 165 United States firms re-
sponding to their survey admitted that they had been the target of
foreign based spying.'" Additionally, a 1987 International Trade Com-
mission study revealed that inadequate protection of United States
intellectual property alone caused annual losses to American corpora-
tions between forty-three and sixty-one billion dollars."
As staggering as these numbers are, there is a high probability
that a great deal of theft and illicit taking (perhaps even the majority
of these activities) remains undetected or is simply not reported.' 2
7 George Wei, Surreptitious Taking of Confidential Information, 12 LEGAL STUDIES 302,330
(1992).
8 Id.
9 Foreign Missions Act and Espionage Activities in the United States: Hearings Before the
Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the Committee on Governmental Affairs, 99th Cong.,
1st Sess. 2 (1985)[hereinafter Foreign Missions Act](statement of Senator William V. Roth Jr.,
Chairman of Governmental Affairs). In addressing the issue of foreign espionage activities in the
United States, Senator William V. Roth Jr., Chairman of Governmental Affairs, illustrated some
of the methods by which foreign operatives obtain United States business information in an
effort to highlight the extent to which American corporations are targeted.
10 The Threat, supra note 2, at 6.
11 Intellectual Property and International Issues, 1991: Hearings before the Subcommittee on
Intellectual Property and Judicial Administration, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1991)[hereinafter Intel-
lectual Property](testimony of Ambassador Carla A. Hills, United States Trade Representative).
Although these figures do not represent a loss resulting exclusively from economic espionage,
they do illustrate the staggering potential for loss for American firms and do not consider losses
that occurred outside the body of intellectual property.
12 The decision to not report espionage activities is understandable for several reasons. First,
such disclosure could have unfavorable economic repercussions on the corporation such as a
decline in the company's stock and a reluctance on the part of investors to continue supporting
the company. Second, many corporations feel that the cost and time of attempting to obtain
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Unfortunately, sophisticated and often undetectable methods of ob-
taining critical information and technology are often used to the point
where many American companies may not know-and may never
know-that they have been targeted. 13 Accordingly, many corpora-
tions may not realize they have been victimized until it is too late.
III. THE ORIGINS OF THE THREAT
In the wake of the Cold War, dramatic changes in economic and
military strategic planning make it very likely that the current high
level of economic espionage will continue, if not worsen, over the next
few years. The rapid changes of the world political climate have added
significance to the surreptitious gathering of economic and technologi-
cal information. Leaders in many countries have begun to realize that
economic power is a fundamental component of national power.'4
Specifically, United States corporations face the threat of eco-
nomic espionage on two fronts. First, private foreign corporations
have applied an increasing amount of intelligence gathering assets to-
ward United States industry. These companies may not necessarily be
directly affiliated with their respective governments, but they are
often involved in a much closer government-to-industry relationship
than we traditionally have in the United States. Second, United
States corporations face a threat from foreign governments which
have diverted their national intelligence assets away from military
objectives in order to apply them to economic objectives. 5 However,
the lines between government sponsored economic espionage and pri-
vate based economic espionage are often blurred. This distinction is
often difficult to ascertain when a government-to-industry relationship
is substantially different than the relationship which prevails in the
United States. 6
compensation is overly prohibitive especially when they have been victimized by a foreign entity.
Third, it may be impossible for a corporation to quantify the ultimate extent of their loss.
13 Milton J. Socolar expressed some of the difficulties in quahtifying the scope of economic
espionage conducted by foreign entities. The Threat, supra note 2, at 10 (testimony of Milton J.
Socolar, Special Assistant to the Comptroller General).
14 Warner, supra note 1, at 6.
15 Robert Gates acknowledged this shift in foreign intelligence priorities when he testified
that "many foreign intelligence services have turned from politics to economics, and the United
States is their prime target." The Threat, supra note 2, at 53 (testimony of Robert Gates, Former
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency).
16 The government-to-industry relationship in Japan, for instance, makes it difficult to deter-
mine if the Japanese government is involved when Japanese companies successfully acquire
United States corporate information in an unauthorized manner. In 1982, Hitachi employees
pled guilty to conspiring to transport stolen IBM design documents and components for every
major part of IBM's newest and most powerful generation of computers which were not yet on
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Foreign intelligence gathering efforts directed against United
States corporations currently originate from the traditional "enemies"
of the United States as well as those countries that have traditionally
been thought of as our "allies."' 7 In many instances, last year's polit-
ical/military ally is this year's economic antagonist 8 Two countries
which best exemplify this dichotomy are Russia and France.
As a former economic and military rival of the United States, the
Soviet Union's desire to obtain United States technology continued
without interruption until the break-up of the Soviet state. It has been
generally known for years that the KGB had been misappropriating
United States corporate secrets through various channels, including
economic espionage. This drive continues unabated in the former So-
viet republics and is fueled in part by.the stresses associated with the
attempted conversion from command management to a free market
system.19 Additionally, the necessity to deal with the economy as a
whole is inexplicably tied to the nature of the former Soviet society.2"
The disintegration of the Soviet empire, however, left the Soviet intel-
ligence infrastructure intact. The GRU, for instance, is still the pri-
mary military intelligence service in Russia.
Economically speaking, Russia currently views economic espio-
nage against American corporate technology as a relatively inexpen-
sive method by which to obtain the critical technology required to
save the unraveling Russian economy.21 In his testimony before the
Congressional Subcommittee on Economic and Commercial Law, for-
mer KGB operative Stanislav Levchenko elaborated on continuing
Russian economic espionage activities around the world.22 In his tes-
timony, Mr. Levchenko advised the subcommittee that Russian eco-
nomic espionage activities continue against lucrative targets within the
United States. Mr. Levchenko additionally warned the subcommittee
that it would be naive to believe that Russia and the newly created
the market. It is still unclear as to whether this was done with the tacit permission of the Japa-
nese government. The Threat, supra note 2, at 8.
17 The French, Japanese, British, Swedes, Swiss, Israelis, and various other "allied" govern-
ments regularly conduct economic espionage activities using private or private sector intelligence
organizations.
18 Professor Warner explains this behavior by crediting United States internationalist eco-
nomic policies during the Cold War with creating a strong, independent, and predatory world
market economy. Warner, supra note 1, at 7.
19 Professor Warner provides an abbreviated analysis of the motivating factors behind this
trend. Warner, supra note 1, at 4.
20 The Threat, supra note 2, at 143.
21 Warner, supra note 1, at 10.
22 The Threat, supra note 2, at 143.
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republics would not continue to conduct external intelligence opera-
tions specifically directed at the United States.23
French economic espionage, as opposed to Russian espionage,
appropriately fits into the gray area between state sponsored and pri-
vate intelligence activities. In either capacity, the French engage in
economic espionage against allies and enemies alike. Specifically,
French targets include companies in which the French government has
either a direct or indirect financial interest.24 Additionally, many au-
thorities speculate that the French Secret Service, Direction Generale
de la Securite Exterieure (DGSE) sometimes goes so far as to buy an
interest in a targeted multinational corporations for the express pur-
pose of acquiring its technology and information for the French gov-
ernment.25 A former director of the DGSE, for instance, publicly
admitted that he personally directed French industrial and technologi-
cal intelligence forces to gather economic information from the
United States and other countries. In one particular instance, he
stated that the service compiled a detailed secret dossier of the propri-
etary proposals from United States and Soviet companies who were
competing with a French company for a billion dollar contract to sup-
ply fighter jets to India.26
In other instances, economic espionage operations appear to be
the result of the momentum created by the long-standing targeting of
United States corporations and the magnitude of resources devoted to
these activities. 27 This momentum will probably continue, and per-
haps intensify, as new governments struggle to gain full control over
their intelligence services. In such instances, increased economic espi-
onage activities by national or private intelligence services may ulti-
mately exceed the limited constraints these governments would like to
apply towards maintaining good relations with the United States.28
Finally, third world countries may now pose a new threat to
American companies. As a result of recent political developments
within former Eastern Block countries, unemployed former intelli-
gence service agents' services are now available on the open market.
Consequently, both government and non-government third world or-
ganizations now pose a threat since they are not constrained by tradi-
23 The Threat, supra note 2, at 143.
24 Warner, supra note 1, at 5.
25 Warner, supra note 1, at 5 n.7.
26 The Threat, supra note 2, at 10.
27 The Threat, supra note 2, at 192 (statement of Geoffrey E. Turner, Senior Consultant,
Information Security Program, Senior Research Institute).
28 The Threat, supra note 2, at 193.
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tional ethics and principles generally used in international business
practices.29
IV. THE TARGETS
Traditional targets of economic espionage usually involve critical
technologies which are often "protected" by United States patent,
copyright, and trade secret laws.30 Additionally, the Federal Bureau
of Investigation has defined critical technologies (sometimes referred
to as core technologies or national critical technologies) as those
deemed critical to enhance national security and economic competi-
tiveness. Examples of these types of technologies include manufactur-
ing processes and technologies, information and communications
technologies, aeronautics and surface transportation systems, and en-
ergy and environmental related technologies.3 ' Department of De-
fense critical technologies focus exclusively on technologies that are
essential to maintain the qualitative superiority of United States
weapons systems. 2 Semiconductor materials, micro electric circuits,
software engineering, simulation modeling radar, and superconductiv-
ity technologies are some of the technologies that fall into this
category. 33
An increasing number of espionage cases have also involved pro-
prietary technology and economic information which falls within the
gray area of existing United States law. This area involves, but is not
limited to, information concerning unclassified United States business
and economic resources, activities, research and development, and
policies. While unclassified, the theft of this information often ad-
versely impacts upon the ability of United States corporations to com-
pete in the world marketplace. Arguably, the need for protecting
information about corporate negotiating positions, costs, economic
feasibility studies, marketing plans, and confidential reports is of vital
importance to United States industry. Such information can often di-
29 The Threat, supra note 2, at 193.
30 Jonathan Kapstein, The West's Crackdown on High-Tech Smuggling Starts to Pay Off,
BUSINESS WEEK, July 29, 1985, at 46-48.
31 The Threat, supra note 2, at 46-47 (statement of William S. Sessions, former Director of
the FBI).
32 The Threat, supra note 2, at 46-47 (statement of William S. Sessions, Former Director of
the FBI).
33 The Threat, supra note 2, at 46-47. See CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, SoVIET Acoui-
SITION OF MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT WESTERN TECHNOLOGY: AN UPDATE (1985)[hereinafter
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY], for a thorough description of specific military applications of
these technologies. See also Martin Tolchin, Crucial Technologies: 22 Make the U.S. List, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 17, 1989, at D1.
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rectly affect the competitive position of a firm more than the unau-
thorized acquisition of its technology.34 Recently, the United States
Department of State emphasized the importance of proprietary infor-
mation in its publication which credited corporate proprietary infor-
mation with being corporate America's "chief competitive asset," and
recognized its overall importance to both American industry and soci-
ety alike.35 Unfortunately, information of this sort is often the most
difficult to protect since both the intelligence community and business
community have not yet agreed on a clear definition of proprietary
information. Both groups, however, recognize the implications associ-
ated with its disclosure to foreign competition.36
V. IMPACG ON NATIONAL SECURITY
Traditionally, concerns over the effects of espionage on national
security have centered upon the transfer of products and technologies
with potential military uses. While there are numerous interpretations
of military "weapons technology," one publication has defined this
technology as the "application of scientific knowledge, technical infor-
mation, know-how, critical materials, keystone manufacturing and test
equipment, and end products which are essential to the research and
development as well as the series manufacture of modern high-quality
weapons and military equipment."37
From a military standpoint, it is easy to understand why economic
espionage directed against defense related industries is a threat to
United States national security. It is crucial to United States national
security to prevent hostile nations from obtaining crucial military
technologies and materials. The domestic economy's ability to satisfy
defense needs hinges upon maintaining ample domestic stocks of criti-
cal materials.38
34 The harmful effects of compromising this information to foreign competition has been
recognized by the FBI and is the focus of a FBI "Threat List Approach" designed to frustrate
intelligence activities that threaten United States national security both from traditional sources
and non-traditional sources which entail an economic threat resulting from foreign based eco-
nomic espionage. The Threat, supra note 2, at 36.
35 The publication asserts that America's livelihood and national strength depend on our
country's ability to protect industrial and economic data. BUREAU OF DIPLOMATIC SECURITY,
U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PUB. No. 10017, GUIDELINES FOR PROTECTING U.S. BUSINESS INFORMA-
TION OVERSEAS 1 (1992).
36 Id. at 36.
37 Intelligence Community Report on Soviet Acquisition of Western Technology, [Apr.-Sept.]
INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) No. 403, at 58 n.1 (Apr. 13, 1982).
38 Harold Hongju Koh et al., Dollar Diplomacy/Dollar Defense: The Fabric of Economics
and National Security Law, 26 INT'L LAW 715, 716 (1992).
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Additionally, the theft of United States military technology and
production information erodes the qualitative edge of the American
military. Defense budget aside, economic espionage threatens the vi-
tality of critical American defense industries. A contemporary exam-
ple could easily involve the Intel 80386 microprocessor which is
currently used in scientific super computers as well as the Army's M-1
tank command systems. Intel spent one hundred million dollars and
four years to develop this chip. If a foreign country illegally obtained
the design and manufacturing facilities for this powerful chip, they
would save at least an equivalent amount of research and develop-
ment resources.39 Such a theft could conceivably have a two-fold im-
pact upon United States national security. First, the loss of this critical
technology would allow a foreign government to divert research and
development resources that ordinarily would have gone into develop-
ing the stolen technology to other military projects.4n Second, since
the loss of technological superiority can occur very quickly, a loss in
military technology could prevent the emergence of an infant industry
that produces defense related products. Since the prohibited costs of
research and development under normal circumstances can adversely
affect such a fledgling company, the loss of a key technology to for-
eign competition can often ring the death knoll to such a company.'
The failure of such a company would then preclude the possibility of
drawing upon this resource in the event of a national emergency.
The threat to United States national security from economic espi-
onage expands beyond the confines of defense related industries.
Much technology developed for military use in the United States has
its beginnings in the private commercial sector and originally may be
designed with civilian applications in mind. As a result, this "dual
use" technology is often the most sought after information by both
foreign governments and corporations alike.42 Unfortunately, United
States corporations not involved in defense contracting are often ill-
prepared to recognize the scope, scale, or intensity of the threat of
economic espionage directed against them. They are even less pre-
pared to defend their trade secrets, proprietary technology, and infor-
39 ROBYN SHOTWELL METc.ALFE, THE Naw WmARD WAR 16 (1988).
40 According to French sources, the Soviet Ministry of Aviation Industry saved almost $256
million in research and development by acquiring Western technology for high-performance air-
crafts between 1976 and 1980. These resources were invariably applied to other Soviet defense
expenditures. Id. at 17.
41 David Scott Nance et al., Regulation of Imports and Foreign Investment in the United States
on National Security Grounds, 11 Micii. J. INT'L L. 926, 949-50 (1990).
42 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, supra note 33, at 14.
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mation and consequently may be unable to retain their international
competitiveness. 43 For example, open source documents revealed that
a French national working for Coming, Inc. in France sold informa-
tion and trade secrets to the French Secret Service regarding Corn-
ing's latest fiber optic technology. This technology had both military
and civilian applications. The Service, in turn, allegedly provided this
information to a French competitor of Coming.'
In 1960, Secretary of Commerce Luther Hodges acknowledged
that obtaining the means of production is often more important than
obtaining the technology itself:
It is necessary to distinguish between giving away secrets, know-how,
and capability. Our manufacture of these [ballbearings] is no secret...
but the capability to do it well and economically has taken years to de-
velop and should not be sold to a potential adversary.... The situation
is not one of selling our adversary a better 'club', but machines which
help produce better 'clubs', faster and cheaper.45
Consequently, the line between military technology and civilian busi-
ness technology is often a thin one. Since the loss of both can have
equally damaging effects on United States national security, they
should be treated equally in the war against economic espionage.
Additionally, foreign based economic espionage constitutes a
threat to United States national security in purely economic terms.
By definition, the term "espionage" concerns the theft of classified
information that bears upon a nation's national security. In a business
context, the definition of "economic espionage" naturally extends to
the surreptitious taking of classified business information and technol-
ogy that has a similar impact on national security but in economic
terms. In short, United States national security depends heavily upon
a healthy domestic economy that is fully capable of supporting United
States military and political goals.46 Foreign based economic espio-
nage directed against American industry unquestionably threatens the
ability of targeted companies to compete on a level playing field in the
world market. As discussed previously, information and technology
43 The Threat, supra note 2, at 193.
44 Mr. Socolar's remarks reflect the degree to which foreign governments conduct economic
espionage against non-military related United States industry on behalf of foreign private corpo-
rations in an effort to obtain dual-use technologies. The Threat, supra note 2, at 11-12 (remarks
of Milton J. Socolar, former Special Assistant to the Comptroller General, U.S. General Ac-
counting Office).
45 LINDA MELVERN ET AL, TECHNO BANDITS 262 (Houghton Mifflin Co. 1984).
46 This note describes how a strong United States national economy is inextricably tied to
United States national security and foreign power projection. In particular, the note illustrates
how United States national security policy is often framed in economic terms. See Koh, supra
note 38.
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can often be appropriated more quickly and cheaply through the ef-
forts of economic espionage than they can through conventional
means. Accordingly, the effects of these actions threaten national se-
curity by degrading the overall vitality of the American economy
which depends on the collective success of corporate America in the
world market. National security no longer can be defined solely in
terms of America's ability to fight a war. Rather, maintaining strong
national security also entails the United States' ability to effectively
compete within the international market economy.4 7
There is yet another reason to maintain strong national security
policies in the face of economic espionage. The increasing decline of
the threat of nuclear war has recently lead to a concurrent increase in
the importance of economic competitiveness in the definition of na-
tional security. National relationships previously defined in terms of
military alliances change significantly when viewed instead in terms of
economic competition. When this occurs, allies become competitors
in economic terms. As economic objectives rise in priority in our al-
lies' definition of national security, so does the interest of allied na-
tions in economic espionage.48 Accordingly, national security policy
and its derivative national policies, with their sole focus on military
and intelligence objectives, do not serve the true national interest.
Loss of United States corporate proprietary information and trade
secrets to economic espionage will increasingly be the consequence of
government policy and programs which adhere to an outdated defini-
tion of national security. The impact of these problems on United
States corporate competitiveness in the international economy will be-
come an increasingly serious concern to the United States national
security that will manifest itself through a lack of American economic
vitality. A significant component of a nation's security is its continued
economic well-being, which depends in large part on its ability to com-
47 A number of scholars, such as David Scott Nance and Jessica Wasserman, find that a
United States national security policy which involves economic vitality is overly problematic.
Nance and Wasserman maintain that a shift to a definition of "national security" based upon
long-term economic welfare would require an overly complex determination of national security
interests for a given product. Both argue that the United States government would have to de-
rive an integrated, quantifiable scheme of what the United States economy should look like at
any given time to maintain its competitiveness. This would result in a "full-blown industrial
policy," as the government would decide what industries are necessary for continued economic
health and which of these may be allowed to succumb to foreign competition. David Scott Nance
et al., Regulation of Imports and Foreign Investment in the United States on National Security
Grounds, 11 MICH. J. INT'L L. 926, 948 (1990).
48 The Threat, supra note 2, at 193 (statement of Geoffrey E. Turner, Senior Consultant,




pete in global markets. Therefore, economic competitiveness must be
more carefully balanced with traditional military and intelligence con-
cerns in determining policy to protect national security.
VI. THE SOLurION
The time has come for United States policy makers to examine
the threat of economic espionage against the backdrop of evolving
patterns of global interdependence, advancing technology, and in-
creasing economic complexity.4 9 In an era of compressed product life
cycles and short-lived technological advances, threats of economic es-
pionage must be stopped quickly and authoritatively to avoid the per-
manent loss of competitive market positions for United States firms.5"
Accordingly, there are serious questions facing our national policy
makers as to what tools should be used to combat the threat of eco-
nomic espionage. Can current United States laws recognize and re-
spond quickly enough to the new competitive realities which result
from rapid technological and economic changes around the globe?5
If so, what new mix of domestic and international actions involving
"carrots and sticks" will be required to effect such a response?52
Ultimately, the solution to the problem of foreign based eco-
nomic espionage will not emanate from one source alone. Rather, an
effective solution will only be obtained through the well concerted ef-
forts our judicial system, legislative bodies, law enforcement agencies,
private industry,53 and through international cooperation. Addition-
ally, efforts to stem the tide of economic espionage activities will re-
quire the regular use of economic power as a tool, either as a stick to
sanction hostile nations or as a carrot to encourage the economic co-
operation and development of friendly ones. 54 To be effective how-
ever, these economic controls must apply with sufficient force to our
49 Intellectual Property, supra note 11, at 239.
50 Intellectual Property, supra note 11, at 237.
51 Mr. Johnson framed this question in recognition of the growing trend to equate United
States economic competitiveness with United States National security. Mr. Johnson's remarks
highlighted the connection between the two interests particularly in the area of strategic United
States industry sectors which affect our defense industrial base for cutting edge technologies. The
importance of a healthy economy within these sectors is further heightened by the increasing
number of United States corporations which are dependent on foreign generated technology to
remain competitive in the world market. Intellectual Property, supra note 11, at 231. (remarks of
Richard Johnson, former Associate General Counsel for the International Trade Administration,
U.S. Dept. of Commerce).
52 Intellectual Property, supra note 11, at 233.
53 BUREAU OF DIPLOMATIC SECURITY, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PUB. No. 10017, GUIDELINES
FOR PROTECTING U.S. BUSINESS INFORMATION OVERSEAS 1 (1992).
54 Koh, supra note 38, at 716.
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adversaries as well as our allies so as to ensure implementation of a
unified and coordinated national policy.55 Additionally, these tools
must be equally effective against both foreign government action as
well as foreign private espionage activities if they are to properly ad-
dress existing concerns.
The urgency of the present situation calls for a quick and authori-
tative response to foreign based economic espionage activities di-
rected against American industry. Until the United States can mount
a coordinated effort in combating foreign based economic espionage
however, the provisions of Section 301 of the Omnibus Trade and
Competitiveness Act of 1988 will serve as powerful, yet flexible, stop-
gap measure in curbing the tide of foreign based economic espionage.
The invocation of these provisions are most appropriate when di-
rected against those countries conducting or condoning the most egre-
gious economic espionage activities.
VII. SECTION 301
Section 301 has been described as the "primary United States
statute providing authority for the President to take action against un-
fair trade practices of other governments which adversely affect
United States commerce.15 6 In short, the purpose of Section 301 is to
enable the President to vigorously combat unfair trade practices so as
to ensure fair and equitable conditions for United States commerce.
Although Section 301 has primarily been used in this context, its over-
all purpose, historical development, and current statutory language
make it a logical choice as a weapon in the fight against economic
espionage.
In order to understand the utility of Section 301 against economic
espionage activities, a description of the section's historical develop-
ment is appropriate. The present version of Section 301 is actually a
series of nine separate sections of the Trade Act of 1974 as amended. 57
A review of the historical development of the present version of Sec-
tion 301 will reveal that with each amendment there has been systemic
broadening of the scope of foreign activities which fall under the pur-
view of Section 301. Accordingly, the current version of Section 301,
as it exists in the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, is
55 Koh, supra note 38, at 716.
56 Shirley A. Coffield, Using Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 as a Response to Foreign
Government Trade Actions: When, Why, and How, 6 N.C.J. INr'L L. & COM. REG. 381 (1981).
57 Omnibus Trade Act, supra note 6.
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sufficiently broad in purpose and language to add economic espionage
to the list of actionable activities.
The origins of Section 301 spring from Section 252 of the Trade
Expansion Act of 1962, Section 301's immediate predecessor. Much
like today's Section 301, Section 252 granted the President the author-
ity to respond to foreign practices that hindered United States trade
or restricted access to foreign markets. This desire to act unilaterally
in an effort to redress trade grievances later manifested itself in the
original Senate report to Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974.58The original purpose of Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 was
to combat unfair trade practices by granting the President authority to
"vigorously" invoke retaliatory action against trading partners engag-
ing in "unfair" trade practices. 59 In addition to having a remedial pur-
pose, Section 301 was also designed for preventative purposes.
Specifically, the provisions of Section 301 were designed to act as a
deterrent against unfair foreign trade practices by placing trading
partners on notice that "if they insist on maintaining unfair advan-
tages, swift and certain retaliation... will occur."6 Thus, Section 301
was also drafted for the purpose of providing the President sufficient
negotiating leverage to effectively reduce a foreign country's unfair
trade practices. 6'
Under the Trade Act of 1974, the President had the authority to
take "all appropriate and feasible steps within his power to obtain the
elimination of such restrictions or [policies or] subsidies... "62 Prior
to invoking retaliatory action, the President had to initially determine
that a foreign government or instrumentality: 1) maintained unjustifi-
able or unreasonable tariffs or other import restrictions;63 2) engaged
in acts or policies which were unjustifiable or unreasonable; 64 3) pro-
vided subsidies on its exports to the United States;65 or 4) imposed
unjustifiable or unreasonable restrictions on access to supplies of
food, raw materials, or manufactured or semi-manufactured products
58 See generally, Kenneth J. Ashman, Note, The Omnibus Trade Act and Competitive Act of
1988-The Section 301 Amendments: Insignificant Changes from Prior Law?, 7 B.U. Irr'L L.J.
115, 119-20 (1989).
59 S. REP. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 164 (1974)[hereinafter S.REP.No. 1298].
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 301(a), 88 Stat. 1978 (1974)(codified as amended
at 19 U.S.C. § 2101 (1994))[hereinafter Trade Act of 1974].
63 Id. § 301(a)(1).
64 Id. § 301(a)(2).
65 Id. § 301(a)(3).
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which burdened or restricted United States commerce.66 Addition-
ally, the Trade Act of 1974 allowed an "interested party" to file a com-
plaint with the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations (STR),
alleging any restrictions, policy or subsidy, and request a public hear-
ing on the matter.67
Although Congress did not specifically define unfairness, the
1973 House Report on the Trade Act of 197468 defined "unjustifiable"
actions as "restrictions which are illegal under international law or in-
consistent with international obligations. ' 69 "Unreasonable" actions
were defined as "restrictions which are not necessarily illegal but
which nullify or impair benefits accruing to the United States under
trade agreements or otherwise discriminate against or unfairly restrict
or burden United States commerce. 70 The 1974 Senate Report
stated that "unfair discrimination" involved "discriminatory rules of
origin, government procurement, licensing systems, quotas ... restric-
tive business practices ... .,,71 In short, the definition of "unreasona-
ble" primarily referred to discrimination unfairness claims because
such claims "nullify or impair" existing international trade benefits ac-
corded to the United States.72
Based on the breadth of these definitions and the Congressional
debate surrounding the Trade Act of 1974, it is reasonable to conclude
that foreign based economic espionage would fall within the realm of
actionable activities under the original Section 301. The House Com-
mittee, for example, deliberately intended the new bill to "open the
scope of retaliatory measures available to combat foreign practices of
all types which ... burden United States commerce." 73 The House
Committee fully understood that burdening United States commerce
was an easy standard to meet. As such, the undeniable role economic
espionage plays in nullifying and impairing the United States' ability
to compete in the international market place logically fits into the type
of foreign practices Congress intended to combat through the use of
Section 301.
66 Id. § 301(a)(4).
67 Id. § 301(d)(2).
68 HousE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, REPORT ON THE TRADE REFoRM Acr OF 1973,
H.R. REP. No. 571, 93 Cong., 1st Sess. (1973)[hereinafter WAYS AND MEANS].
69 Id. at 65.
70 Id.
71 S. REP. No. 1298, supra note 59, at 164.
72 Tyler Goldman et al., Project, The Fair in Fair Trading: A Positivist Determination of Fair
Trading Under § 301 of the 1974 Trade Act, 18 (1992)(unpublished senior research, Northwest-
ern University School of Law).
73 WAYS AND MEANS, supra note 68, at 66.
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Within this context, the House committee not only permitted, but
"expected," the President to depart from international obligations
when national interests dictated and international procedures were in-
adequate to deter unjustifiable or unreasonable practices. 74 Today,
the sheer amount of economic espionage activities which occur within
our borders is prima facie evidence that international procedures are
inadequate or incapable of preventing this type of threat to United
States industry. Accordingly, executive action taken under Section 301
against the threat of economic espionage would be an appropriate ex-
ecution of this mandate.
Furthermore, invocation of Section 301 against foreign economic
espionage activities would be consistent with the zeitgeist that domi-
nated United States foreign trade policy at the time the original ver-
sion of Section 301 was enacted into law. The Burke-Hartke Trade
Bill, 75 which was competing for passage with the Trade Act of 1974,
typically illustrated many of Congress' concerns over the United
States' ability to compete in the international marketplace. The bill,
like Section 301, was ultimately designed to protect United States in-
dustry. Although the bill was never passed despite significant support,
Congressman Burke and his supporters used as their rallying cry the
credo that "new times require[d] new policies. 76 Interestingly, the
very concerns that plagued Congress in the early 1970's, namely the
continuing shrinking role of United States influence in the world
economy, global interdependence, advancing technology, and increas-
ing economic complexity, continue to be significant in today's global
economy. As such, it appears that by applying Section 301 against the
threat of economic espionage today, we would be utilizing its provi-
sions in the same spirit as those who originally promoted its use back
in 1974.77
Finally, Congress was particularly concerned about the Presi-
dent's ability to safeguard United States interests through interna-
tional agreements. This issue manifested itself in situations where it
was impossible in practice for the United States to obtain a determina-
tion with respect to certain practices of United States trading partners
which appear to be clear violations of international agreements. 7 Ac-
74 WAYS AND MEANS, supra note 68, at 65.
75 Tariff and Trade Proposals, Part 1-16, Hearings Before the Comm. on Ways and Means,
House of Representatives, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1895-97 (1970)[hereinafter Tariff and Trade
Proposals].
76 Id.
77 Goldman, supra note 72, at 29.
78 Goldman, supra note 72, at 67.
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cordingly, the original Section 301 went so far as to make foreign un-
fair trade practices actionable under United States law regardless of
the legality of the practices as determined under international trade
agreements.79 In particular, Congress was especially concerned about
the dispute resolution process under the GAT. Since the structural
decision making progress of the GATT dictates that decisions are
made on the basis of a consensus, no assurances could be made that
disputes would be resolved impartially.80 Today, this same concern
logically extends to the current version of the GATr and other inter-
national agreements or international law tribunals. In the context of
international adjudication of economic espionage activities against
American industry, the United States has no assurances that interna-
tional tribunals will consider certain actions objectionable or could ef-
fect appropriate changes even if they did.8 This is particularly true in
instances where activities may not violate "the letter of the law," but
are nonetheless inconsistent with international standards of conduct.
Similar problems can also occur in instances where the government-
to-industry relationship of a particular country results in the position
that certain actions are not actionable due to that country's particular
cultural views regarding the role of economic espionage in promoting
economic competition.'
The Trade Agreement Act of 1979 merely added procedural
amendments to Section 301 in an attempt to "encourage the use of the
President's authority. '8 3  In short, these amendments were designed
to correct some of the shortcomings of the original Section 301. How-
ever, the revised Section 301 was still intended to cover "all [the] acts,
policies, [and] practices" of the original Section 301.84
One of the most significant amendments to Section 301 under the
Trade Agreements Act of 1979 was the imposition of stricter time lim-
its for the conclusion of Section 301 actions and investigations.85 An-
79 Trade Act of 1974, supra note 62, § 301(a)(1).
80 Goldman, supra note 72, at 67.
81 Alan 0. Sykes, "Mandatory" Retaliation for Breach of Trade Agreements: Some Thoughts
on the Strategic Design of Section 301, 8 B.U. INT'L LJ. 301,315-16 (1990). Under many interna-
tional agreements, no external authority exists to force participating parties into honoring their
agreements. In the GATT for example, a single nation, including the signatory in violation of
the agreement, can block a consensus vote necessary to invoke sanctions.
82 See infra note 16.
83 Marsha A. Echols, Section 301: Access To Foreign Markets From An Agricultural Perspec-
tive, 6 INV'L TRADE LJ. 4, 16 (1980-81).
84 S. REP. No. 249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 236 (1979)[hereinafter S. REP. No. 249].
85 Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, § 301, 93 Stat. 144 (1979)(codified as
amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2501 (1982)). The imposition of stricter time limits were in response to
objections that Section 301 actions took too long to terminate. Accordingly, Congress required
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other important amendment provided the President with expressed
authorization to initiate independent investigations without having to
receive a request for action by an interested party.8 6
The imposition of stricter time limits required the United States
Trade Representative (USTR) to make a recommendation to the
President on a course of action regarding a Section 301 petition within
one year of the petition's filing.87 The President then had twenty-one
days to decide on an appropriate response based upon the USTR's
recommendation.8 8 However, the President still retained total discre-
tion over his response. In placing these time limits on the President,
Congress shared a common recognition among Section 301 petitioners
that "in order for [an] action on matters.., to be effective, it must be
timely."8 9
Similarly, the authorization of the President to initiate Section
301 cases of his own volition may have been the result of the relatively
small number of private petitions that were filed between January
1975 and July 1979, when the Trade Agreement Act passed.90 Some
commentators have suggested that Congress specifically enacted this
provision in conjunction with the procedural changes in an effort to
resuscitate Section 301 by placing this power in the hands of the Presi-
dent who was in a much better position to assert such claims.9'
Despite the 1979 amendments to Section 301, a great deal of dis-
content still existed over continuing trade problems resulting from un-
fair trade practices on the part of United States trading partners.'
This discontent was exacerbated by the economic recession of the
early 1980's; in turn, it created a general sentiment that the new wave
of protectionism which was upon the United States "constitutes a seri-
ous threat to the Western alliance." 93 Accordingly, Congress once
again amended Section 301 through the Tariff and Trade Act of 1984.
the United States Trade Representative to make a recommendation to the President on a course
of action regarding a Section 301 petition within one year of the petition's filing. The President
then had twenty-one days to decide on an appropriate response based upon the United States
Trade USTR's recommendation. However, the President still retained total discretion over his
response.
86 Id § 301(c)(1). Prior to this amendment, the President only had implied authority to initi-
ate such investigations.
87 S. REP. No. 249, supra note 84, at 240.
88 S. REP. No. 249, supra note 83.
89 S. REP. No. 249, supra note 83, at 241.
90 During this period, the USTR initiated eighteen cases under Section 301.
91 Goldman, supra note 72, at 31.
92 Ashman, supra note 58, at 125-26.
93 Ashman, supra note 58, at 125.
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Among some of these amendments to Section 301 were more
thorough definitions of the terms "discriminatory," "unreasonable,"
and "unjustifiable." 94 Specifically, "unjustifiable" was defined as "any
act, policy or practice [which was] in violation of, or inconsistent with,
the international legal rights of the United States." 95 "Unreasonable"
was defined as those practices which were "unfair and inequitable,"
but which were "not necessarily in violation of, or inconsistent with,
the international legal rights of the United States. '9 6 Although the
Act of 1984 required a petitioner to show that the practices in ques-
tion had inflicted an injury, the Act merely required that "the trade
practice 'burden or restrict United States commerce'."97 By creating
such a lenient test however, it appears as though Congress intended to
continue to fulfill one of the primary purposes of the original Section
301-"to eliminate unfair trade practices through the mere threat of
retaliation."98
The final version of Section 301 was enacted into law by Presi-
dent Reagan on August 23, 1988. Like its predecessors, Section 301
still authorized the President to use Section 301 authority to enforce
United States rights under trade agreements or to respond to the "un-
fair" trade practices of foreign nations. Pursuant to this goal, this ver-
sion ultimately provides the USTR, and ultimately the President, with
a great deal of flexibility and discretion in determining the existence
of, and appropriate retaliatory responses to, these practices. 99
In actuality, Section 301 transfers authority from the President to
the USTR to determine whether a foreign trade practice is actionable.
If the USTR determines that a foreign government practice is incon-
sistent with international agreements, unreasonable, unjustifiable, or
burdens United States commerce, he must take "all appropriate and
feasible action authorized ... subject to the specific direction, if any,
of the President ... to obtain the elimination of [these foreign] act[s],
94 Prior to the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, the terms "unreasonable" and "unjustifiable"
were not defined in the statute itself. Rather, these terms were only defined by the House Re-
port on the Trade Reform Act of 1973. See Ways and Means, supra notes 69-71.
95 Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-573, § 304(f)(2), § 2411 (e)(4)(A), 98 Stat.
2948 (1984) [hereinafter Trade Act of 1984].
96 Id. § 2411(e)(3)(A). This definition implies a mandate to the President to retaliate beyond
the confines of international trade agreements, such as the GATI'. See also Robert E. Hudec,
Retaliation Against "Unreasonable" Foreign Trade Practices: The New Section 301 and GATT
Nullification and Impairment, 59 MnN. L. Rv. 461, 518 (1975).
97 Trade Act of 1984, supra note 95, § 2411(a)(1)(B)(ii).
98 Ashman, supra note 58, at 128.
99 Omnibus Trade Act, supra note 6.
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polic[ies], or practice[s]."'1  To accomplish this, the USTR has the
authority to impose various import restrictions on the offending na-
tion's exports to the United States or withdraw the benefits of United
States trade agreements. The USTR also has expressed authority to
enter into binding agreements designed to eliminate or phase out the
foreign acts or policies at issue.1 1
To assert a violation under Section 301, a petitioner must demon-
strate that the conduct of a foreign government was "unjustifiable,"
"unreasonable," or "discriminatory."'0" However, the flexibility that
Section 301 gives the USTR in determining whether a foreign coun-
try's actions satisfy these requirements is one of the attributeg that
makes the Section so appropriate in addressing foreign based eco-
nomic espionage activities. Specifically, the breadth of the Section's
statutory language makes it possible to include foreign based eco-
nomic espionage into the realm of activities covered by Section 301.
A. Unreasonable Actions
Perhaps the greatest expansion of a petitioner's ability to state a
cause of action involving economic espionage activities involves "un-
reasonable" governmental practices. Section 301 currently defines
"unreasonable" activities as those which "while not necessarily in vio-
lation of, or inconsistent with, the international legal rights of the
United States, [are] otherwise unfair and inequitable."'01 3 Included in
this definition are three specific foreign practices. These practices fal
under the headings of workers rights, export targeting, and market
access. 1°4 Of the three, only export targeting and market access are
applicable to our discussion.
1. Export Targeting
Section 301(d)(3)(E) specifically defines export targeting as:
any government plan or scheme consisting of a combination of coordi-
nated actions (whether carried out severally or jointly) that are be-
stowed on a specific enterprise, industry, or group thereof, the effect of
which is to assist the enterprise, industry, or group to become more com-
petitive in the export of a class or kind of merchandise. 10 5
100 Trade Act of 1984, supra note 95, § 1301, § 301(b)(2).
101 Trade Act of 1984, supra note 95, § 1301, § 301(c)(1)(C)(i).
102 Trade Act of 1984, supra note 95, § 1301, § 302(a)(1).
103 Trade Act of 1984, supra note 95, § 1301, § 301(d)(3)(A).
104 Trade Act of 1984, supra note 95, § 1301, § 301 (d)(3)(B)(iii)(I)-(V).
105 Trade Act of 1984, supra note 95, § 1301, § 301 (d)(3)(E).
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Traditionally, this type of activity involves the directing of private cap-
ital as well as government financial resources to a particular industry
on a preferential basis, or providing preferential sources for govern-
ment procurement. 10 6 However, this definition can easily be inter-
preted to apply to egregious instances of governmental sponsored
economic espionage activities, which by definition, have the effect of
assisting a particular industry or enterprise in becoming more compet-
itive in the international marketplace. 7 As discussed previously in
this comment, information and technology can often be appropriated
more quickly and cheaply through the efforts of economic espionage
than through conventional means. Accordingly, United States indus-
tries targeted for economic espionage suffer from an inherent disad-
vantage when attempting to trade goods and services in the global
market. This is especially evident when these industries are forced to
compete with the very countries who misappropriated their technol-
ogy and information. Ultimately, this disadvantage translates into an
export advantage for the industries benefiting from the use of eco-
nomic espionage. Moreover, the definition of export targeting does
not require that the foreign government necessarily be successful in
making the beneficiaries of their espionage activities more competi-
tive in the export of their goods and services. Instead, the statute de-
fines a particular action as export targeting even when it merely assists
the enterprise in achieving this particular "effect." Additionally, by
defining export targeting as any plan which may involve actions car-
ried out "severally or jointly," the statute suggests that the President
may invoke the provisions of Section 301 in the face of a single inci-
dent of economic espionage directed against a targeted industry. This
latitude is especially important in the context of economic espionage
since it is often difficult for a targeted industry to prove that a govern-
ment has either been systematically or repeatedly conducting espio-
nage activities against them. 08
2. Market Access
A second government practice considered "unreasonable" by
Section 301 are those that deny fair and equitable market opportuni-
ties. 1 9 These actions include "[t]he toleration by a foreign govern-
106 HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, REPORT ON THE TRADE AND INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC POuCY REFORM Acr OF 1987, H.R. REP. No. 40, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., pt.1, 65
(1987)[hereinafter ECONOMIC POLICY].
107 See infra note 44.
108 See infra note 12.




ment of systematic anticompetitive activities by private firms or
among private firms in the foreign country that have the effect of re-
stricting, on a basis that is inconsistent with commercial considera-
tions, access of United States goods to purchasing by such firms." 110
Just as the export targeting provision of Section 301 addresses
unreasonable government actions, this provision allows the President
to invoke Section 301 measures in an effort to stop similar actions on
the part of foreign private entities. Having established how economic
espionage affects the ability of targeted industries to compete in the
global economy, it is easy to understand how economic espionage falls
within the list of activities which are "inconsistent with commercial
considerations." However, the debilitating effects of privately spon-
sored economic espionage activities are further exacerbated when
they are conducted with the assistance of foreign governments. In
short, such activity on the part of private firms, when coupled with the
failure of a foreign government to intervene to eliminate such behav-
ior, can act as a barrier to market access which is as great as any for-
mal governmental act, policy, or practice."' Accordingly, this
provision inherently provides the President with the required flexibil-
ity to address the threat of economic espionage activities condoned or
sponsored by foreign governments. The leverage provided to the Pres-
ident under this provision is particularly applicable to addressing the
problems of foreign espionage activities originating from corporations
in countries where the government-to-industry relationship is often
difficult to discern.112 In such a case, the United States could ordina-
rily expect to encounter substantial obstacles toward obtaining an ap-
propriate remedy for its grievances. Under this particular provision
however, the President will have an effective course of action that will
place needed pressure on foreign governments to police their corpora-
tions' espionage activities regardless of the extent of government
involvement.
B. Unjustifiable Actions
Foreign trade practices may also be actionable under Section 301
if the USTR determines that they are "unjustifiable" and "burden or
restrict United States commerce." An act, policy, or practice is con-
sidered unjustifiable if "it is in violation of, or inconsistent with, the
international legal rights of the United States" including, but not lim-
110 Omnibus Trade Act, supra note 6, § 1301, § 301(d)(B)(i)(III).
111 Ashman, supra note 58, at 135.
112 See infra note 16.
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ited to, "any act, policy, or practice described [above] which denies ...
the right of establishment or protection of intellectual property
rights.""' 3 Although the terms "inconsistent" and "burden or restrict"
are not defined or explained, they presumably include practices that
do not necessarily violate the letter of a trade agreement or other in-
ternational legal obligation but nonetheless deny commercial bene-
fits." 4 This definition thus operates as a "catch-all" phrase which can
encompass a variety of foreign trade practices to include those involv-
ing economic espionage. Within this context, the provision provides
private parties broad authority to initiate Section 301 actions irrespec-
tive of the "legal technicalities" of international agreements or the
laws of particular countries." 5 The broad nature of this language has
often lead to a debate as to whether the definition of "unjustifiable"
was meant to encompass activities outside the scope of existing inter-
national agreements. Some commentators have suggested that the in-
tended meaning of "unjustifiable" is one which "embrac[es] conduct
which only has to violate the spirit, if not the letter, of binding interna-
tional agreements. 11 6 Similarly, it is also likely that informal interna-
tional agreements or state practices could be invoked under Section
301 in challenging "unfair but technically legal conduct.""' 7
In applying this rationale, the statutory language used for defin-
ing unjustifiable foreign practices is particularly applicable to the un-
authorized taking of industrial proprietary information. As
mentioned earlier in this comment, proprietary information often falls
within the gray area between United States and international law.
Although the surreptitious taking of such information may not neces-
sarily be prohibited by United States law, and thus may be technically
legal, it certainly violates the international spirit of free trade and co-
operation reflected by most trade agreements and international
law." 8 Similarly, the statutory language of Section 301 leaves nothing
open to interpretation in terms of intellectual property protection.
113 Omnibus Trade Act. supra note 6, § 1301, § 301(d)(4)(A) and (B).
114 K. Blake Thatcher, Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974: Its Utility Against Alleged Unfair
Trade Practices By the Japanese Government, 81 Nw. U. L. REv. 492, 504 (1987).
115 Id. at 499, 504.
116 Bart S. Fisher et al., § 301 of the Trade Act of 1974: Protection for U.S. Exporters of Goods,
Services and Capital, 14 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 569, 597 (1982).
117 Id.
118 This spirit has also been reflected in recent attempts to establish an international code of
conduct which establishes standards of conduct for both corporations and their national govern-
ments. U.N. Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
International Economic Policy, Trade, Oceans, and Environment of the Senate Comm. on Foreign
Relations, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1990).
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Accordingly, there can be little doubt that economic espionage activi-
ties are "unjustifiable" practices when they infringe or impair United
States intellectual property rights and laws." 9
VIII. PURPOSE AND SCOPE
To the extent that Section 301's ultimate economic purpose is "to
foster United States economic growth" and development in the
United States, the inclusion of economic espionage to the list of ac-
tionable activities logically fulfills this imperative. 20 Such an expan-
sion of the traditional bounds of Section 301 is not without precedent
in the statute's history. On the contrary, Section 301 petitions have
been acted upon to address a broad spectrum of burdensome foreign
practices. For example, the types of goods that have been the subject
of investigations under Section 301 have included rice, silk, leather,
and cigars.' 2 1 Likewise, the types of foreign practices that have come
under Section 301 scrutiny have been sufficiently broadened to in-
clude restrictions on the practice of law by foreign attorneys in
Japan.122
Regardless of the details involving each of these claims, these pe-
titions historically represent the potential breadth of actionable for-
eign practices under Section 301. Although trade in goods has
traditionally been the subject of Section 301 cases, the expansion of
301 jurisdiction into areas inadequately covered by international
agreements or international law represents the importance of Section
301 in helping to fill the gaps in areas that are increasingly gaining
importance to United States trade policy.123
IX. PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS
There are a number of reasons why Section 301 is particularly
well suited to be used as a weapon against foreign based economic
espionage. Besides being applicable to both government and private
action alike,12 4 Section 301 has other characteristics which readily lend
themselves to the fight against the surreptitious taking of critical
119 Another provision of Section 301, Section 1303, § 182(a)(1)(known as "Special" 301) spe-
cifically mandates that the USTR identify and take appropriate action against countries that
deny adequate protection for intellectual property rights.
120 Trade Act of 1974, supra note 62, § 2102. See also Trade Act of 1984, supra note 95, § 2102
(Supp.IV 1986).
121 Thatcher, supra note 115, at 500.
122 Thatcher, supra note 115, at 500-01.
123 Thatcher, supra note 115, at 501.
124 See infra note 118.
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United States industrial information. These provisions include the op-
portunity for private entities to initiate Section 301 investigations, the
transfer of authority from the President to the USTR, and the estab-
lishment of expressed time limits for the implementation of Section
301 actions.
Through Section 301, private entities can file a petition with the
USTR whenever they believe they have evidence that they have been
the victim of economic espionage activities perpetrated by a foreign
government or corporation.125 Since most conventional trade agree-
ments only offer dispute resolution mechanisms to nation-states, this
process offers a targeted corporation a method by which to address its
grievances that does not ordinarily exist. Additionally, this provision
increases the likelihood that private corporations will step forward
and admit they have been victimized.
Ordinarily, a single company would not be likely to assert such a
claim because it would seem futile to single-handedly resist actions
that are already difficult to detect, much less resist. However, this
provision gives hope to such a corporation through the knowledge
that the power and resources of the national government will be ap-
plied toward investigating their claim and taking action when deemed
appropriate. These private petitions, in turn, will ultimately provide
the government with a better picture of the nature and extent of cur-
rent espionage activities. This information will then enable the USTR
to focus its resources in an effort to prevent subsequent occurrences
through its application of the negotiating leverage provided by Section
301. If the USTR seeks a bilateral resolution with the country, or
presents the case pursuant to GATT, this provision has the added
benefit of ensuring appropriate private sector involvement. To this
extent, private corporations will enjoy participation in the preparatory
and on-going aspects of United States involvement in the consultative
and dispute settlement procedure. 12
6
The transfer of authority and mandatory response provisions also
make Section 301 an attractive tool against economic espionage. As
mentioned previously, Section 301 transfers authority from the Presi-
dent to the USTR to determine whether a foreign practice warrants a
response from the United States. The Act requires the USTR to initi-
ate an investigation and ultimately take action based on that investiga-
tion, subject to the discretion of the President. This transfer of
authority will enable the USTR to take a more effective course of
125 Omnibus Trade Act, supra note 6, § 1301, § 302(a)(1).
126 S. REP. No. 249, supra note 84, at 239.
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action in pursuing allegations of economic espionage since it is not
subject to the same political pressures as the President. 27 Some com-
mentators suggest that by delegating this decision making power to
the USTR, Congress sent a direct signal to the President that, except
for very extraordinary situations, Congress wants the USTR decisions
to be made based on the merits of the petition alone and not in the
light of other policy decisions.12 8 This sentiment was reflected in the
Senate's explanation for enacting this provision. For example, the
Senate declared that if the President does not adhere to the USTR's
recommendations, his "discretion must be exercised in light of the
need to vigorously ensure fair and equitable conditions for U.S.
commerce."'
129
Furthermore, the USTR's investigative power, its primary role in
negotiating trade agreements, and its overall legal expertise make it
the most logical agency for making and enforcing economic assess-
ments relating to economic espionage activities.130 Advocates of the
delegation of power argue that the USTR's retaliatory authority facili-
tates a more rapid response to violations, thereby creating a more ef-
fective deterrent.' 3 1  This deterrent primarily results from the
knowledge on the part of our trading partners that under Section 301,
the USTR can invoke sanctions without Congressional approval.
Since the need for Congressional approval often involves exten-
sive floor debates resulting in unrelated amendments that may
weaken a retaliatory response, trading partners might conclude that
threats of retaliation are not credible when such approval is neces-
sary.' 32 In addition, the mandatory response provision of Section 301
provides the USTR with additional leverage by requiring the USTR
to retaliate any time it finds a foreign practice to be "unjustifiable."'1 33
This requirement ultimately "provide[s] greater certainty of response
by the United States to enforce United States rights under trade
agreements and to remove or redress foreign practices recognized as
illegal or otherwise unjustifiable."'' " In short, the deterrent effect of
127 Ashman, supra note 58, at 131.
128 N. David Palmeter, Section 301: The Privatization of Retaliation, 3 TRANSNAT'L LAW 101,
106 (1990).
129 S. REP. No. 249, supra note 84, at 238.
130 As noted earlier, the elimination or reduction of economic espionage activities will only
come about as the result of the cumulative efforts of several agencies.
131 Sykes, supra note 81, at 311.
132 Sykes, supra note 81, at 311.
133 Omnibus Trade Act, supra note 6, § 1301, § 301(a).
134 ECONOMIC POLICY, supra note 106, at 62.
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Section 301 is further strengthened when countries know that retalia-
tion will be compelled when their espionage activities are discovered.
Finally, the strict time limits placed on USTR actions by Section
301 will ensure that economic espionage cases are investigated and
resolved quickly. 35 Under these provisions, the USTR must deter-
mine whether a foreign action was unfair within thirty days after the
conclusion of formal dispute resolution. Section 301 also empowers
the USTR to make final determinations (as opposed to recommenda-
tions), and limits the time for determination to eighteen months after
the initiation of an unfairness investigation. 3 6 The effect of this sec-
ond requirement is that the USTR must make an unfairness determi-
nation notwithstanding an on-going dispute settlement procedure.
This time period is further abbreviated to twelve months when an un-
fairness investigation involves non-trade agreements. 37 In instances
of cases involving "priority" countries138 violating American intellec-
tual property rights, unfairness determinations must be made within
six to nine months. 39
As previously noted, actions to prevent or mitigate damages re-
sulting from economic espionage activities must be done expeditiously
if they are to effective. 4 ° Prior to 1988, countries could effectively
(and legally) delay dispute resolution without fear of retaliatory ac-
tion. Typically, countries would negotiate in "good faith" by making
long and complicated arguments in an attempt to justify their actions.
Historically, such tactics have been known to last for years or until the
United States could secure an impartial ruling. 14 1 However, Section
301 offers a powerful response to this common tactic. Because of the
mandatory time provisions of Section 301, trading partners have little
incentive to engage in such delay tactics.
135 Omnibus Trade Act, supra note 6, § 1301, § 304.
136 Omnibus Trade Act, supra note 6, § 1301, § 304(a)(2)(A)(ii).
137 Omnibus Trade Act, supra note 6, § 1301, § 304(a)(2)(B).
138 Priority countries are those "which are not making progress in granting intellectual prop-
erty rights protection or market access for United States persons that rely on such protection,
where the foreign practice is particularly onerous and most adversely affects United States prod-
ucts." Ashman, supra note 58, at 137 n.138.
139 Ashman, supra note 58, at 137 n. 138. Since most economic espionage cases will not in-
voke trade agreement provisions, or may involve the violation of intellectual property rights,
most investigations will probably fall under these abbreviated time restrictions.
140 See infra note 12.




The proposition that Section 301 will provide a flexible, powerful
response to foreign governments engaged in economic espionage re-
mains to be tested. Ultimately the decision to use this powerful tool
must be considered in conjunction with international trade issues, ex-
isting United States obligations, and United States national security
issues. Admittedly, the ultimate remedy to the problem of economic
espionage will not spring from the invocation of economic sanctions
alone. What seems clear at present, however, is that the rising threat
of economic espionage in America must be addressed quickly and ef-
fectively. Until the United States can develop a more effective solu-
tion to the problem of foreign economic espionage practices, Section
301 offers the United States a valuable tool for deterring these activi-
ties and an intimidating response should such deterrence fail.
